ModelContextPro.dev / Specification
MCP 2026-07-28 Stateless Transport & Tool Security Spec
Normative checklist for deploying horizontal, edge-safe Model Context Protocol servers without sticky memory sessions or ambiguous tool descriptions.
1. Stateless Streamable HTTP Invariants
Under the 2026-07-28 MCP profile, every tool call must be independently authenticatable and replay-safe across edge workers or autoscaled replicas:
- No implicit server-side session state: omit long-lived SSE affinity; pass explicit bearer or OAuth 2.1 tokens on every
POST /mcprequest. - Strict
Origin&MCP-Protocol-Versionheaders: reject unverified browser origins with HTTP 403 and negotiate exact version2026-07-28. - Bounded payload budgets: enforce explicit
maxLength,maximum, andadditionalProperties: falseon every toolinputSchema.
2. Canonical tools/list Contract
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 1,
"result": {
"tools": [
{
"name": "dns_record_lookup",
"description": "Read-only lookup of A, AAAA, CNAME, and TXT records for one hostname.",
"annotations": { "readOnlyHint": true, "destructiveHint": false, "idempotentHint": true },
"inputSchema": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["hostname"],
"properties": {
"hostname": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-z0-9.-]{3,253}$" }
}
}
}
]
}
}
3. Tool-Poisoning & Shadowing Defense
| Threat Class | Detection Rule | Remediation |
|---|---|---|
| Prompt injection in description | Imperative overrides (ignore previous, hidden XML/HTML tags, base64 payloads) | Restrict descriptions to plain declarative 1–2 sentence summaries under 280 chars. |
| Destructive tool without guard | Tool name matches delete|drop|purge|transfer with destructiveHint unset | Declare explicit annotations.destructiveHint: true and require policy gate before execution. |
| Unconstrained object input | "type": "object" missing properties or additionalProperties: false | Pin every parameter type, enum, and required array so callers cannot smuggle extra keys. |